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The association between earnings forecast in IPO 
prospectuses and earnings management:  
An empirical analysis 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the level of earnings management for large IPOs that provide earnings 
forecasts and those that do not provide forecasts in the IPO prospectus.  Using a sample of 
368 IPO firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1985 and 2012, we find that 
the level of earnings management is lower for IPOs that provided earnings forecasts, than 
for those which did not provide a forecast. This evidence is robust, controlling for 
endogeneity and sample selection. Further tests reveal that IPOs that provide forecasts 
outperform their counterparts in the long run, using various long term performance 
measures. Overall, our results suggest that earnings forecasts at the time of listing convey 
useful information to investors on the quality of the company listing in the market.   
 
Keywords: Initial Public Offerings, Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Management, Long-run Performance.  
JEL: G2, G28, G17, G1, G11 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management has received significant attention over the last few decades, 
ĚƵĞƚŽ ŝƚƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶ ĨŝƌŵƐ ?ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?&ŽƌĨŝƌŵƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ ůŝƐƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚŝƐ
impact is exacerbated by asymmetric information between owner-managers and potential 
outside investors (Toeh et al. 1998a; DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik 2001). Recent 
evidence in the earnings management literature has focused on the complex relationships 
between earnings management and governance (Jaggi, Leung and Gul 2009), 
debt/diversification (Rodriguez and Hemmen 2010), compensation (Ibrahim and Lloyd 2011) 
and failure rates (Alhadab, Clacher and Keasey 2015).    
In this paper, we investigated the relationships between provision of earnings 
forecasts at the time of listing and earnings management and more specifically, the motive 
of large Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in providing earnings forecasts and the value of such 
information to IPO investors. In the UK, IPOs are not required to provide earnings forecasts 
at the time of their listing and such disclosure is voluntary.  However, such voluntary 
information assists IPO investors in making informed investment decisions (Chong and Ho 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐ ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ ĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚƐ ŝŶ ĂŶ /WK ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƵƐ could be interpreted as a 
ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?ƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ůŝƐƚŝŶŐŽĨ
the firm. An optimistic forecast could force managers to manipulate the level of earnings 
upward. Further, the risk of optimistic forecasts is that firms are likely to lose public trust 
and face difficulties when dealing with their suppliers and customers.  Due to the risks 
associated with earnings forecasts and possible legal repercussions, US IPOs are not 
permitted to provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing (Teoh et al. 1998a). The motive 
for small IPOs in providing forecasts and subsequent earnings management is documented 
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in the literature (Cormier and Martinez 2006; Cormier, Pascale, and McConomy 2014). 
However, we are not aware of any study which examines why large IPOs provide forecasts 
at the time of their listing. Typically, large IPOs are known to the IPO investors and the 
market; hence the incentive to provide forecasts is weak. The UK market provides a good 
setting for investigating this issue, since most large IPOs in UK generally provide earnings 
forecast in their prospectuses. Investigating the relationship between earnings forecasts and 
ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ/WKŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?1 The London Stock 
Exchange Listing Rules (Yellow Book) and the Financial Services Act 1986 stipulate the 
requirements for disclosure of earnings forecasts.2 
IPO firms are associated with high information asymmetry and this could be 
mitigated by the disclosure of earnings forecasts at the time of listing. The issue of 
information asymmetry also applies to non-IPO firms. For instance, Shivakumar, Urcan, 
Vasvari & Zhang (2011) document that in the case of non-IPO firms, earnings forecast is an 
important source of informatŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞĚƵĐĞƐ ĨŝƌŵƐ ? ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐ
information. By implication, earnings forecasts provide valuable information to the investors 
and it is far more important that it is made available at the time of listing, due to limited 
information available about the firm prior to the IPO. However, using forecasts as a signal 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƐŬ ŽĨ ůŽƐŝŶŐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ƚƌƵƐƚ ? ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚ ĞƌƌŽƌ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ? ƚŚĞ
difference between actual and forecast earnings) is significant.  A significant forecast error 
encourages investors to disinvest their holdings in the IPO firms concerned and could lead 
                                                             
1 We thank the referee for pointing out that understanding the relationship between earnings forecasts and 
earnings management is more important for retail investors than institutional investors. Typically, institutional 
investors hold portfolios diversified across a number of stocks. 
2 There are no significant changes in the Financial Services Act of 2010, 2012 and 2013 regarding earnings 
forecasts. 
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to a poor long term performance. We investigated long run performance using two 
measures: (1) buy and hold market-adjusted returns over three-years, post-listing, and (2) 
the Fama and French three-factor model.  
Using a sample of IPO firms listed on the LSE Main Market over the period 1985-
2012, we find IPOs that provide earnings forecasts manage the level of their earnings less 
than those that do not provide forecasts at the time of listing.3  This evidence is robust using 
(i) accrual and real earnings management measures, and (ii) controlling for sample selection 
and endogeneity. Further, we find that IPOs that provide earnings forecasts outperform 
thosĞƚŚĂƚĚŽŶ ?ƚ ?ƵƐŝŶŐďƵǇĂŶĚŚŽůĚŵĂƌŬĞƚ-adjusted returns and the three-factor model. 
Taken together, our findings suggest that large IPOs that provide forecasts do not 
manipulate the level of their earnings upwards; instead, they use forecasts as a reliable 
signal of their quality.  
Past studies in the UK on earnings forecasts examine the forecast error and its 
determinants, ignoring the implication of earnings management for these IPOs (Dev and 
Webb 1972; Ferris and Hayes 1977; Keasey and McGuinness 1991). In Canada, Cormier, 
Pascale, and McConomy (2014) find that IPOs with better corporate governance are less 
likely to provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing. In France, Cormier and Martinez 
(2006) document that IPOs which provide earnings forecasts manage the level of their 
earnings much more than those that do not provide forecasts. Our study differs from the 
above studies, in that IPOs in these markets are relatively smaller than UK IPOs. Further, 
listing requirements are different in these markets, relative to the UK Main Market. Hence, 
                                                             
3 Firms listed on a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange (i.e., Alternative Investment Market (AIM)) do not 
provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing and hence are excluded from our IPOs sample.  
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small IPOs have stronger incentives than large IPOs, to provide earnings forecasts. The 
question of why large IPOs provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing remained 
unexplored hitherto. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature. In addition, we aim to 
investigate the long-term implications of providing earnings forecasts to investors, an issue 
that has not been addressed in the previous studies (e.g. Cormier and Martinez 2006; 
Cormier et al 2014). Large IPOs are known to the market, attract retail and institutional 
investors at the time of listing and hence understanding the motive of providing forecasts is 
important for these investors, especially the retailers.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature on earnings management, earning 
forecasts, and long-run performance. It extends prior research on the relationship between 
IPOs and earnings management (Teoh et al. 1998a) by showing that large IPOs providing 
earnings forecasts manage the level of their earnings less than those that do not provide 
forecasts. In addition, we show that these IPOs have a better long-run performance, using 
various performance measures. Our results are important to short term and long term 
investors, and provide insights into the information conveyed in the earnings forecasts at 
the time of listing. Taken together, our results show that managers of large IPO firms that 
provide forecasts, do not behave opportunistically to manage the level of their earnings 
upward and they use it to communicate with outsiders on the firm's quality.  
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we review the literature related to 
earnings management; in Section 3, we discuss hypotheses, data and methodology; the 
ƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů findings are discussed in Section 4 and Extension in Section 5, while the 
conclusion is presented in Section 6. 
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2. Motivation and Past Literature  
2.1 Motivation 
IPO firms that provide earnings forecasts are more likely to have a stronger motive 
of managing earnings, when they are small (Cormier and Martinez 2006). Announcement of 
earnings forecasts could put such firms under the compulsion of having to meet the target 
and failure to do so would have severe consequences for future capital raising. The costs of 
inaccurate forecasts include costs associated with loss of reputation, and they are significant 
for the IPO firms, since they have a tendency to go to the market for raising additional funds 
(Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik 1992). It is also possible that IPO firms might 
voluntarily disclose information about future earnings prospects, whenever the perceived 
benefits exceed the costs (Dye 1985; Donotoh 1989). Therefore, IPO firms are likely to 
voluntarily disclose only credible information, in order to avoid legal penalties for 
misrepresentation (Teoh et al. 1998a). However, those firms that do not possess sufficient 
information will not disclose earnings forecasts, due to possible adverse effects on their 
valuations. Providing earnings forecasts at the time of listing could serve as a credible signal 
for large IPOs and they use the forecasts to share their private information with the 
investors and thereby receive a high valuation (Hertnett 2010).  
 DuCharme et al. (2001) and Chang et al. (2010) documented that earnings 
management leads to a negative performance. Teoh et al. (1998a) find poor long run 
performance for IPOs in the US associated with high level of earnings management, as 
measured by discretionary accruals. This is because IPOs cannot maintain the facade of 
good quality for a long period and hence must disappoint their investors. We investigate the 
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long-run performance of UK IPOs that provide earnings forecasts and those that do not.  
Unlike the US, UK IPOs can provide forecasts at the time of listing. 
 
2.2 Earnings Management and IPO 
Earnings management is a natural and corporate phenomenon in the market place 
(Liang 2004). Information asymmetry between managers and existing or potential 
shareholders contributes to the earnings management. Teoh et al. (1998a) find that IPO 
firms in the US use accrual earnings management to manipulate reported earnings during 
the IPO year. They also report that this practice leads to a decline in stock prices, post-IPO. 
Similarly, Roosenboom, Van der Goot and Mertens (2003) found in Netherlands that IPOs 
that manage the level of accrual earnings experience a decline in stock returns for the year 
following the IPO. Darrough and Rangan (2005) have documented that firms taken public by 
reputable underwriters are less likely to engage in earning management, because of their 
reputation. An earlier study (Ball and Shivakumar 2008) does not find evidence of earnings 
management in UK, prior to the IPO year. Alhadab, Clacher and Keasey (2012) find that firms 
listed on the UK Main Market had a lower level of accrual earnings management, than those 
listed on the AIM (Alternative Investments Market). Previous studies provide evidence 
suggesting that managers of IPO firms have strong incentives to manipulate earnings for the 
year preceding the IPO. Possibly, they do so to improve the likelihood of a successful IPO, 
inter alia.  
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2.3 Earnings Forecasts Decision 
Earlier studies have examined factors that influence the decision to provide earnings 
forecasts. Generally, owners/managers of a firm considering an IPO, have more information 
on possible success post-IPO, than potential investors or IPO investors (Leland and Pyle 
1977). Hughes (1986) provided a signalling model and suggested that retained ownership 
and disclosure ĂďŽƵƚĨƵƚƵƌĞĐĂƐŚĨůŽǁĂƌĞŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽĐŽŶǀĞǇŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?
Titman and Trueman (1986) report that the choice of an investment banker and auditor 
could be used to signal the value of the IPO firm. Managers provide earnings forecasts to 
reduce information asymmetry (Verrecchia 2001). Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman (2008) 
provide a summary of management's motives for providing earnings forecasts and the 
characteristics of forecasters versus non-forecasters. Furthermore, managers with equity-
based compensation are known to provide earnings forecasts to avoid equity mispricing 
(Hirst et al 2008). Hertnett (2010) documented that forecasts could be perceived as credible 
information by market participants. Firms with an earnings history may find it easier to 
provide forecasts at the time of listing, while firms with less earnings history could benefit 
from providing forecasts, because of the higher information asymmetry associated with 
such firms. Cormier et al. (2014) examined the decision to provide earnings forecasts for 
small IPOs in Canada. The authors find that corporate governance determines the likelihood 
of firms providing forecasts at the time of listing. Our study investigates the reasons for 
large IPOs providing earnings forecasts at the time of listing.  
 
 
3.  Hypotheses, Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Hypotheses  
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 Earlier studies (Zang 2012) document that managers engage in real earnings 
management activities throughout the fiscal year. Generally, accrual earnings management 
is used at the end of the fiscal year for adjusting earnings to meet the desired threshold. 
Graham et al. (2005) find that IPO firms conduct extensive accrual-based earnings 
management in the year prior to the IPO. Based on the previous evidence, we examine 
whether large IPOs that provide forecasts in their prospectuses and engage in real and 
accrual earnings management. Given that IPOs providing forecasts at the time of listing are 
ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ /WKƐ ĂƌĞ ƵŶůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ
future earnings. However, an optimistic forecast could result in significant litigation and 
reputational costs to the IPO firm. Arguably, large IPOs provide forecasts to signal their 
quality and not necessarily engage in managing the earnings.   We test the following: 
H1: All else being equal, large IPOs that voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts in their 
prospectuses are less likely to engage in accrual and real earnings management, post 
IPO. 
Our second hypothesis is related to the long-run performance. Previous studies 
(Penman 1980; Clarkson et al. 1992) find that voluntary earnings forecast disclosures are 
likely to be optimistic. Hence, it is possible that IPOs which provide forecasts underperform 
those that do not, in the long run.  Possibly, IPOs that provide forecasts are likely to be 
conservative in their forecasts and hence unlikely to overestimate their future earnings. Ball 
and Shivakumar (2008) document in UK that firms have a tendency toward conservative 
reporting. Further, overestimating future earnings may damage a firm's reputation and lead 
to significant litigation costs (Chong and Ho 2007). Therefore, IPOs that provide earnings 
forecasts are expected to out-perform the others in the long-run, if and only if, providing 
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earnings forecasts conveys information about the quality of the issuing firm. Hence, we test 
the following: 
H2: When earnings forecasts disclosed in prospectuses are conservative, the long-run 
performance of IPOs that provide forecasts should be better than that those that do not 
provide forecasts.  
 
3.2 Data Description and Methodology 
Our initial sample consisted of 417 firms that went public on the Main Market of the 
LSE between 1985 and 2012. Financial and utilities firms were excluded due to differences in 
their reporting and disclosure requirements (see Teoh et al. 1998 a&b; Chang, Chung and 
Lin 2010; Chen, Lin and Zhou 2005; Lee and Masulis 2011; Wongsunwai 2012). We also 
excluded IPOs listed on AIM. This is because AIM IPOs are small and have easier listing 
requirements than firms seeking listing on the Main Market. Further, firms incorporated 
abroad are also excluded from the sample. To be included in the sample, we required the 
prospectuses and accounting data to be available. These criteria led to a final sample size of 
368 firms with full data.4 For the control sample of non-IPO firms, we included firms that 
had at least six observations in each IPO year for each industry group. Our approach in 
selecting the control sample of non-IPO firms is similar to those of Rosner (2003), Iqbal, 
Espenalub and Strong (2009) and Athanasakou, Strong and Walker (2011).  
We estimated accrual earnings management using a cash flow, following the 
approach of, Hribar and Collins (2002) and Alhadab et al. (2015). The cash flow approach has 
                                                             
4 See Appendix 1 for the distribution of the full sample and final sample. 
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minimal measurement errors, compared to the balance sheet approach. Information on 
issue price, IPO date, market capitalisation, and gross proceeds, among others, were 
manually collected from the prospectuses, as was the Accounting data from the 
prospectuses during the year of the IPO, while data for non-IPO firms were collected from  
Datastream. We measured earnings management during the year of IPO instead of post- 
IPO, due to the problems associated with earnings management post-IPO (see Ball and 
Shivakumar 2008). Measuring earnings management post-IPO is likely to be biased, because 
of the capital raised during the IPO, which has an impact on the firm's size.5 However, due to 
the data limitation, we did not control for production cost manipulations.6 
 To examine the association between earnings forecasts and earnings management, 
we used the following logistic model:   
ii
iiii
iiiii
IndYearrshiptainedowne
BigNPlacingrUnderwritengUnderprici
CashROALeverageSizeindexEMforecastsEarnings
HE
EEEE
EEEEEE


 
Re
__
10
9876
543210
 (1) 
Earnings forecast is a dummy variable taking the value of one, if the IPO firm has provided 
earnings forecast in the prospectus and zero otherwise. EM_index is one of the following 
measures of earnings management: (1) discretionary accruals, (2) abnormal cash flows from 
operations, or (3) abnormal discretionary expenses7. Size is measured by the total value of 
assets during the IPO year. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the total value of assets. 
ROA is the operating income divided by the average total assets. Cash is cash flow from 
                                                             
5 See figure 1 Appendix 2, the earnings managements over -3 and +3 window relative to the IPO year. 
6 See Appendix 3, the discussion on how earnings management is calculated.  
7 Our measures of earnings management are similar to those of Alhadab et al. (2015). 
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operations. Under-pricing ŝƐ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĚĂǇ ?Ɛ ĐůŽƐŝŶg 
market price and the offer price, divided by the offer price. Underwriter is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1, if the IPO is underwritten by a reputable underwriter and is zero 
otherwise. Placing is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the offering is a placing 
and is zero otherwise. Big N is a dummy variable equal to 1, if an audit firm is one of the big 
four audit firms (i.e., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young 
and KPMG).8 Lastly, Retained ownership is the percentage of shares retained by the existing 
shareholders at the time of the IPO. We use clustered standard errors to control for the 
effect of industry clustering. 
 
3.3 Endogeneity and sample selection  
IPOs firms that provide earnings forecasts could manage reported earnings 
(upward/downward) to meet their forecasts (Cormier and Martinez 2006). If earnings 
forecast and earnings management are jointly determined, it is important to address the 
endogeneity between the two.  
 The univariate results in Table 3 shows that IPOs providing earnings forecasts are 
fundamentally different from those that do not. Further, only a small number of IPOs 
provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing. This indicates a sample selection problem 
and possible endogeneity between earnings forecasts and earnings management. To 
address the issue of endogeneity and sample selection, we used Heckman and Instrumental 
Variable (IV) regression. The following outlines how we addressed the selection and 
endogeneity concerns: In step I, we estimated the probability of providing profit forecasts 
                                                             
8 We manually searched the auditing firm for each IPO and assigned one if the auditing firm is one of the big 
four auditing firms. 
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using equation (2). The predicted value from equation (2) is converted into a ratio of 
probability density function to cumulative distribution function (i.e., Inverse Mills) and used 
to correct for sample selection in the IV regression.   
   
Step I: 
iiiii eLeverageAgeSizeownershiptainedforecastofit 43210 _Re_Pr EEEEE    (2) 
In Step II, we used IV regressions to address endogeneity concerns related to the sample of 
IPOs that provide earnings forecast. In the IV regression, the earnings forecast is the 
predicted value from stage I. The determinants of providing earnings forecasts are similar to 
those of Cormier and Martinez (2006). Further, we included inverse Mills ratio from step I to 
correct for sample selection and predicted value to address the endogeneity. Equation (3) 
specification corrects for sample selection and endogeneity concerns.  
Step II: 
 
 
i
ii
iiiii
IndYear
millsInverseBigNUnderwrierngUnderprici
CashROAAgeownershiptainedforecastsEarningsindexEM
H
EEEE
EEEEEE


 
_
_Re__
9876
543210
(3) 
 
The coefficient estimates in equation (3) are unbiased estimates. We used the Sargan-
Hansen Test for over identification and the Cragg-Donald test for weak instrument. The null 
hypothesis for the Sargan test is that the instruments are valid, while for the Cragg-Donald 
test, the null hypothesis suggests that the instruments are weak. Since the latter test 
requires a tolerable bias, we used a 10% threshold. 
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3.4   Long-run performance  
To investigate the long-run performance, we used two performance measures: (1) 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) and (2) the Fama and French three-factor 
model.9 The first method comƉƵƚĞƐ ,Z ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ƉŽƐƚ-IPO, using monthly 
data, starting four months after the first fiscal year end adjusted for market returns over the 
same time horizon ?  similar to the method used by Teoh et al. (1998 a & b). As a measure of 
robustness, we examined the impact of earnings management and earnings forecasts on 
BHAR calculated over one year, two years and three years respectively.  We estimated the 
following model specification:   
 
ii10i987
i6i5i4i3i2i10i
BigNUnderpricerUnderwriteOWN
LageROASizeerror_forecastforecastindex_EMBHAR
XOOOO
OOOOOOO

 
 (4) 
A positive and significant Owould suggest better long-run performance for forecasters than 
non-forecasters. A positive insignificant O would indicate comparable long-run performance 
between forecasters and non-forecasters.10 The second measure is the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model. We computed monthly portfolio returns for IPOs that provide 
earnings forecasts and those that do not and ran separate regressions, as follows:  
itititfmtitfpt HML.hSMB.s)RR(bRR HD                  (5)  
A significant and positive Dwould suggest abnormal returns on the portfolios of 
forecasters/non-forecasters, while negative and significant Dindicates poor long-run 
performance for forecasters and non-forecasters.  
                                                             
9 We are grateful to Alan Gregory for providing us with the data on these three factors: risk premium, SMB and 
HML. 
10 Table A2 in the Appendix shows that the correlation between earnings management and earnings forecast is 
not high and therefore there are no concerns over multicollinearity problem. 
15 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 reports the distribution of IPO firms by industry, using the Fama and French 
industry classification. The table shows the distribution for the full sample, followed by the 
sub-samples of IPOs that provide and those do not provide earnings forecasts at the time of 
the listing. The figures reported in Table 1 exhibit a large variation in sectors across the 
sample of IPO firms. Durable consumer, energy (oil and gas), chemical, and allied products 
were the least represented sectors for the full sample and sub-samples, whereas wholesale 
and business equipment are the two best represented, followed by the sector labelled 
others. This sector includes construction, building materials, transport, hotels, bus service, 
and entertainment. This distribution is consistent for all IPOs, regardless of the forecasts. It 
is evident from Table 1 that IPO firms are clustered in some sectors, while other sectors 
attract only a few IPOs. We include industry dummies in our multivariate analysis to 
minimise the clustering effect and or over-representation.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample of IPOs. The table shows 
that, on an average, earnings management varies between -0.020 and 0.042, based on our 
three measures. The highest earnings management measure is discretionary accrual 
earnings management, whilst the lowest is abnormal discretionary expenses. This is 
comparable with the findings of Alhadab et al. (2015). In our sample of IPO firms, 27.4% 
provided earnings forecasts at the time of IPO, while 72.6% did not. The fact that only a 
small number of IPOs provide forecasts is consistent with the previous studies (e.g. Cormier 
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and Martinez 2006).  It is evident from the table that the forecast error is minimal, with 
mean and median values of less than 1 %. Clearly, IPO firms are not optimistic in their 
earnings forecasts at the time of listing. The median (mean) size as measured by the total 
assets is £43.25 (£254.26) million, while the median (mean) leverage is 37.58% (41.75%). 
These figures are comparable with the previous studies of UK IPOs listed on the Main 
Market (Ahmad and Jelic 2014; Alhadab et al. 2015). The median ROA is 6.57%, while the 
mean is 4%. This suggests that ROA is generally high for a few IPO firms, but for most IPOs 
the ROA is low. It is evident from the table that, on an average, an IPO firm listed on the 
Main Market has a positive cash flow of £11.8 million and a minimum negative cash flow of 
about £30.92 million. On an average, the IPO firms are mature, as measured by age (average 
of 8.8 years), and sell 43.7% of their shares on an average at the time of listing, while 
retaining 56.3%. The median (mean) under-pricing in our sample is 10.71% (7.28%). This is in 
line with a previous UK study (Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed 2012). Only 17.8% of our 
sample of IPO firms is underwritten by reputable underwriters. Approximately 40% of the 
IPO firms are backed by reputed auditors, compared to 60% backed by less reputable ones. 
51% of the IPO firms in our sample are placing, implying that their shares are placed with 
institutional and high-net-worth investors. In the case of non-placing, the shares are sold to 
all investors including the retail category.    
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 
 The results presented in Table 3 show the difference in medians between IPOs that 
provide and those that do not provide forecasts at the time of listing. It is clear from the 
table IPOs that the firms which provide earnings forecasts tend to manipulate the level of 
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earnings downward, compared to those that do not provide forecasts. The difference in the 
medians' is statistically significant at 1% using accrual or real earnings management. It is 
possible that IPO firms that have provided earnings forecasts were not optimistic in their 
forecasts and hence the incentive to an upward earnings manipulation is weak. The table 
also shows that the characteristics of the two sub-samples of IPOs are different in terms of 
ROA, cash richness, maturity, and the level of underpricing at the time of listing. In addition, 
IPOs that provide earnings forecasts tend to sell more shares at the time of listing with 
positive market adjusted buy and hold returns, while those that do not provide forecasts, 
sell fewer shares at the time of listing and experience negative market adjusted BHAR. The 
difference in the median characteristics between the two sub-samples of IPOs is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Overall, the results show that the characteristics of IPO firms that 
provide earnings forecasts are large and different from those that do not provide forecasts 
at the time of listing.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2. Earnings Management and Profit Forecasts 
Table 4 reports the main test of hypothesis 1, which focuses on the relationship 
between the likelihood of providing earnings forecasts and earnings management. Unlike US 
IPOs, UK IPOs can provide earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. Hughes (1986) found 
that firms can mitigate information asymmetry by communicating private information to 
investors and dŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĞ ? dŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ŝŶ dĂďůĞ  ? ƐŚŽǁ ƚŚĂƚ /WKƐ ƚŚĂƚ
provide forecast are less likely to engage in earnings management, as compared to IPOs that 
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do not provide forecasts. This evidence is statistically significant at the 5% level, using 
discretionary accrual earnings management or abnormal cash flows from operations. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest a relationship between the probabilities of 
providing forecast and earning managements, when earnings managements are measured 
as abnormal discretionary expenses. Overall, the results are consistent with our first 
hypothesis, which suggests that firms that provide earnings forecast are unlikely to 
manipulate the level of earnings. It is also possible that IPOs use forecasts as a signal of their 
quality and to distinguish themselves from other IPOs. Our results show that there is strong 
evidence that large companies, as measured by the logarithm of total assets, have a high 
probability of providing forecasts to signal their quality. However, highly leveraged firms are 
unlikely to provide a forecast at the time of the IPO. This is consistent with Healy and 
WĂůĞƉƵ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƌŝƐŬǇ ĨŝƌŵƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ /WKƐ ? ĂƌĞ ƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ
forecasts due to litigation concerns. 
Our results show that mature firms, as measured by age, are likely to provide earnings 
forecasts and experience lower under-pricing. However, IPO firms that are underwritten by 
reputable underwriters are less likely to provide earnings forecasts. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Titman and Trueman (1986). Interestingly, the probability of providing a 
forecast is high, when the IPO firms use placing as a listing method. This evidence indirectly 
suggests that earnings forecasts are used to signal the quality of the IPO. Such a signal 
would enable the IPO firm and its underwriter(s) to attract institutional investors, whose 
involvement into the IPO process is critical to the issuing firm. 
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[Please insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.3. Endogeneity and sample selection 
We assume that the relationship between earnings management and providing 
forecasts are exogenous. Nonetheless, Kasznik (1999) reported that earnings management 
is likely to prevail among firms that provide forecasts, compared to those that do not. 
Furthermore, the author argues that providing forecasts motivates firms to manage 
earnings to meet their forecasts. Cormier and Martinez (2006) document a similar issue in 
the context of French IPOs. These evidences suggest possible endogeneity between 
providing earnings forecasts at the time of listing and earnings management. Another 
related issue is that our study examines the implication of providing earnings forecasts, 
while most IPOs in our sample did not provide forecast at the time of listing. Together, the 
above evidences indicate possible sample selection and endogeneity concerns. We address 
the issue of endogeneity and selection effect in the Methodology section (Section 3.3). 
Model1 in Table 5 shows that the probability of providing earnings forecasts at the time of 
listing decrease by 33.5% for a unit increase in the retained ownership. High leverage 
decreases the probability of providing forecasts by 6.1%, while the size of the IPO at the 
time of listing increases the probability of providing earnings forecasts by 2.9%.   Model 2 
through Model 4 show the IV regression results, where the dependent variable is earnings 
management and proxied by discretionary accrual, abnormal cash flow and discretionary 
expenses respectively.  Following Cormier and Martinez (2006), we excluded leverage and 
size from the second stage of IV regression, as these variables are more likely to determine 
the probability of providing forecasts than managing earnings.  It is evident in Model 2 
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through Model 4 that high retained ownership reduces the level of earnings management 
significantly. In addition, the level of earnings management is less for IPOs that provide 
earnings forecasts than those which do not. This evidence is statistically significant, supports 
our hypothesis and is consistent across various measures of earnings management.  
The level of underpricing at the time of listing does not explain any earnings 
management during the IPO year. The level of earnings management is less for IPOs 
characterised by high ROA at the time of listing and/or backed by reputable underwriters.  
The inverse Mills ratio is significant in Model 2 through Model 4, suggesting a sample 
selection effect. We do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid using 
the Sargan-Hansen test, but we reject the null that the instruments are weak instruments, 
using the Cragg-Donald test.  Taken together, the results of Tables 5 indicate that IPOs 
providing forecasts at the time of listing manage their earnings less than those that do not,  
controlling for sample selection and endogeneity.  We control for industry and year of listing 
to avoid possible year or industry effects.11   
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
 
5. Extension Long-run Performance 
 To investigate the implication of providing earnings forecasts to the long term 
investors, we compared the long-run performance of IPOs that provide forecasts with those 
that do not. Table 6 shows the results of long run performance as measured by BHAR and 
the effect of earnings management for the three measures is examined separately due to 
                                                             
11 Table 2 in the appendix shows that our variables are not highly correlated, suggesting that our models do 
not suffer from multicollinearity.  
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high correlations (please see Table 1A in the appendix). Panel A Model 1, shows that BHAR is 
lower for firms with higher upward level of earnings management at the time of listing. This 
evidence is significant at the 1% level, using accrual and real earnings management. The 
results are consistent with those of Teoh et al. (1998b), who reported a similar effect for the 
US IPOs. Model 2 includes a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs that provide 
forecast at the time of listing and zero otherwise. The results show that firms that provide 
earnings forecasts at the time of listing outperform those that do not provide forecasts. 
Difference in the performance is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, a dummy 
variable does not reflect the quality of earnings forecast provided by the IPO firms, while 
the forecast errors measure the reliability of earnings forecast. To address this issue, we 
used forecasting error instead of forecast dummy, measured as the difference between 
actual earnings reported immediately after the IPO and earnings forecasts reported in the 
prospectuses. It is evident in Model 3 that higher earnings management leads to lower long-
run performance. Moreover, the results show that high forecast errors lead to poor long-run 
performance. This is because long-term investors become disappointed when the forecast 
error is high and hence sell their holdings. Such behaviour would drive the price down and 
lead to poor long-run performance. Panel B, shows the impact of providing earnings 
forecasts on one year, two years and three years BHAR, controlling for additional IPO 
characteristics such as size, ROA, retained ownership, underwriter's reputation, under-
pricing and auditor's reputation. BHAR measured over three years might overstate the 
impact of providing forecasts. Hence, we examined the relationship between earnings 
forecasts and BHAR over one year, two years and three years respectively. The results are 
robust and show that an upward level of earnings management leads to negative 
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performance as measured by one year, two year and three years BHAR. These results are 
consistent with those of previous studies (DuCharme et al. 2001; Chang et al. 2010). 
Although providing profit forecasts leads to a positive performance, significant forecasting 
errors lead to a negative performance. Stated differently, better long-run performance for 
the IPO firms is not determined by provision or non-provision of earnings forecast, but 
rather by the quality of forecast earnings. In fact, IPO firms with high ROA and maturity 
perform better, on an average, than their counterparts. However, highly underpriced IPOs 
underperform (generate negative returns) in the long run, consistent with the findings of 
Ritter (1991). IPOs that retained more shares at the time of listing do not seem to perform 
well in the long run, while those backed by reputed auditors tend to perform better. The 
evidence is significant, statistically but not economically. The intercepts in all models are 
negative, suggesting poor performance for IPO firms on an average. Overall, our results 
show poor performance for IPO firms, but IPOs that provide forecasts with minimum 
forecast errors, tend to perform well in the long run.   
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
 
 Table 7 shows comparison of the long-run performance of IPOs that provide and 
those that do not provide earnings forecasts, using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model. We calculated monthly portfolio returns for all IPOs from 1985 to 2012. We then 
matched each portfolio return with excess market returns, SMB and HML to assess the long-
run performance. Model 1 shows the results for IPOs that provide forecasts, while Model 2 
shows the results for those do not provide forecasts. The intercepts from Models 1 and 2 
measure the long-run abnormal performance. The estimated coefficients for alpha measure 
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the abnormal performance; it is positive for the firms which provide forecast and negative 
for those do not. IPOs that provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing have a positive 
alpha of 0.007 compared to a negative alpha of 0.0012 per month for firms that do not 
provide. This is equivalent to 0.7% when controlling for market risk premium, size, and 
growth. Overall, these results suggest that IPO firms that provide forecasts experience post 
abnormal returns, while those that do not provide forecast are associated with negative 
performance of 0.12%. Nonetheless, the positive and negative performance are weak and 
only significant at the conventional 10% level. Tables 6 & 7 both support hypothesis 2 that 
IPOs use earnings forecasts to signal the quality of the firm and not to exploit short term or 
long term investors.  
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we examined whether (and to what extent) UK IPO firms providing 
earnings forecasts are likely to manage the level of their earnings. Our results show that 
forecasters do not manipulate the level of earnings upward, regardless of the measures of 
earnings management. We find that large-sized IPOs and those backed by reputed auditors 
are less likely to manage the level of their earnings at the time of listing. Further analysis 
revealed that poor long-run performance, using market adjusted buy and hold returns and 
the Fama and French three-factor model, is restricted to IPOs that do not provide forecasts.  
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Our study contributes to the existing literature on earnings forecasts, earnings 
management, and long-run performance. It extends prior research on the relationship 
between IPOs and earnings management (Teoh et al. 1998a), by demonstrating that large 
IPOs providing earnings forecasts do not manage the level of their earnings upwards. 
Further, poor long-ƌƵŶ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ /WK ĨŝƌŵƐ ŝƐ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĂďůĞ ƚŽ ŝƐƐƵĞƌ ?Ɛ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? KƵƌ
results are important for IPO investors, who typically invest in IPO firms over a long period, 
and provide insight into the information conveyed in earnings forecasts at the time of 
listing. Overall, our results show that large IPOs that provide forecasts do not behave 
opportunistically to manage the level of their earnings upward; they rather use the forecasts 
to communicate the firm's quality to outsiders.  
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Table 1: Industry distribution 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the IPO firms by industry using the Fama and French industry 
classification. The data is tabulated by full sample, forecaster and non-forecaster sub-samples at the 
time of IPO. 
 
Distribution by industry 
Full sample   Forecast=1   Forecast=0 
Freq % 
 
Freq % 
 
Freq % 
  (#) (%)   (#) %)   (#) (%) 
Non-durable Consumer 30 8 
 
8 2 
 
22 6 
Durable consumer 6 2 
 
1 0 
 
6 2 
Manufacturing 26 7 
 
7 2 
 
18 5 
Energy oil and gas 7 2 
 
2 1 
 
5 1 
Chemicals and allied products 11 3 
 
2 1 
 
10 3 
Business equipment 52 14 
 
14 4 
 
38 10 
Telecom 14 4 
 
5 1 
 
10 3 
Wholesale 64 17 
 
12 3 
 
52 14 
Health care 16 4 
 
2 1 
 
14 4 
Others 140 38 
 
47 13 
 
93 25 
Total 368 100   101 27   267 73 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the main variables 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample during 1985-2012. EM_discretion is 
earnings management measured by discretionary accruals. EM_cash flow abr is earnings 
management measured by abnormal cash flows from operations. EM_discretion exp is earnings 
management measured by abnormal discretionary expenses. Forecast dum is a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 if an IPO firm provides a forecast at the time listing and zero otherwise. 
Forecast_error is the difference between actual profit reported immediately after the IPO and profit 
forecasts reported in the prospectuses. Total assets are the total value of assets (£ 1000s) at the 
beginning of the year. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the total value of assets. ROA is the 
operating income divided by the total assets. Cash flow is cash flow from operations in thousands. 
Age is measured as the difference between the IPO date and the date of incorporation in years. 
Underpricing ŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĚĂǇ ?ƐŵĂƌŬĞƚƉƌŝĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŽĨĨĞƌƉƌŝĐĞ ?
divided by the offer price. Retained ownership is the percentage of shares retained by the existing 
shareholders at the time of the IPO. Underwriter is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
underwriter is reputable and zero otherwise. Big N is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an audit firm is 
one of the big 4 audit firms (i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young 
and KPMG). Placing is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the offer is a placing and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Variables Mean Median STD Min Max 
            
EM_discretion 0.0426 0.0403 0.2055 -0.4339 0.6421 
EM_cash flow abr 0.0205 0.0300 0.2886 -0.7999 0.8346 
EM_discretion exp 0.0271 0.0301 0.0421 -0.0884 0.0961 
Forecast dum 0.2744 0.0000 0.4368 0.0000 1.0000 
Forecast_error 0.0014 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.045 
Total asset 254261.70 43248.00 730131.10 2365.000 5197800.0 
Leverage 0.4175 0.3758 0.2901 0.0092 0.8704 
ROA 0.0404 0.0657 0.1400 -0.4334 0.3838 
Cash flow  11844.56 1646.00 38206.31 -30916.00 270000.00 
Age  8.8813 6.9600 8.2817 3.5000 37.0120 
Underpricing 0.0728 0.1071 2.9137 -0.0826 0.2957 
Retained ownership 0.563 0.6100 0.2117 0.0500 0.7500 
Underwriter 0.1786 0.0000 0.3835 0.0000 1.0000 
Big N 0.398 0.000 0.4114 0.0000 1.0000 
Placing 0.5163 1.0000 0.5002 0.0000 1.0000 
N 368         
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Table 3: Median test forecasters vs. non-forecasters. 
Table 3 reports the difference-in-median test results for the variables defined in Table 1. The sample 
is divided into forecasting and non-forecasting IPOs. Z-test is the test of the difference in median 
between the two sub-samples. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variables Median values   Diff 
  Forecast=1 Forecast=0   Z-test 
EM_discretion -0.0160 0.0967 
 
4.64*** 
EM_cash flow abr -0.0755 0.0152 
 
-4.64*** 
EM_discretion exp 0.0197 0.0406 
 
1.99** 
Total asset 47014.5 39338.0 
 
-0.590 
Leverage 0.4000 0.3700 
 
-1.15 
ROA 0.0884 0.0519 
 
-4.58*** 
Cash flow  1901.0 1518.0 
 
-1.71* 
Age  10.1200 6.3200 
 
-4.49*** 
Underpricing 0.0881 0.1304 
 
2.870*** 
Retained ownership 0.4812 0.7210 
 
2.17*** 
BHAR 0.021 -0.0781 
 
-1.99** 
N 101 267 
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Table 4: Multivariate results 
Table 4 provides the results of the logistic regression analysis for the full sample. EM_index is a 
measure of earnings management and it is discretionary accruals in Model 1, Abnormal cash 
flow in Model 2 and Discretionary expenses in Model 3. Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is the operating income divided by the 
total assets. Cash flow abs is the logarithm of absolute value of cash flow from operations. 
LAge is the logarithm of age. Underwriter is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
underwriter is reputable and zero otherwise. Placing is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if the IPO is a placing and zero otherwise. Retained ownership is the percentage of shares 
retained by the firm at the time of listing. Big N is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an audit firm 
is one of the big 4 audit firms in Model 3. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if the IPO provides earning forecast and zero otherwise. Reported coefficients 
are the marginal effects from the logit model. The values in brackets are the p-values. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables Model1   Model2   Model 3 
              
EM_index -0.4489*** 
 
-0.3282** 
 
-0.3297 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.357) 
Size 0.1064*** 
 
0.0797** 
 
0.0466*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.006) 
Leverage -0.2948** 
 
-0.2639** 
 
-0.0042 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.513) 
ROA 0.2869 
 
0.1787* 
 
0.0509 
 
(0.169) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.895) 
Cash flow (abs) -0.0381*** 
 
-0.0182* 
 
-0.0283* 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.0923) 
LAge 0.0948*** 
 
0.0972** 
 
0.0897*** 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.001) 
Underpricing -0.0073*** 
 
-0.0059* 
 
-0.0083** 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.030) 
Lead-underwriter -0.1971*** 
 
-0.2053*** 
 
-0.2219*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.000) 
Placing 0.5139*** 
 
0.4958**** 
 
0.4133*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Retained ownership -0.0412* 
 
-0.0654** 
 
-0.0023* 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.088) 
Big N -0.0028 
 
-0.0112 
 
-0.0017 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.312) 
 
(0.557) 
Constant -8.1543 
 
-0.8730 
 
-2.5183** 
 
(0.371) 
 
(0.476) 
 
(0.047) 
      Industry & year Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
No of obs 368 
 
368 
 
368 
Wal chi2 20.7   23.7   39.89 
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Table 5: Instrumental Variable two-stage. 
Table 5 provides the regression analysis for the full sample, controlling for endogeneity. Size is 
the logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is the 
operating income divided by the total assets. Cash flow abs is the logarithm of the absolute 
value of cash flow from operations. Placing is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the IPO is 
a placing and zero otherwise. Big N is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an audit firm is one of the 
big 4 audit firms. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Probit Model IV Regressions 
 
Model1  Model2 Model3 Model 4 
 Variables Coeff  
Marginal 
Effect 
Discretionary 
accruals  
 Abnormal cash 
flow 
Discretionary 
expenses   
Retained ownership -0.8748*** -0.3351 -0.0372* -0.1889*** -0.0263* 
 
(0.000)  (0.053) (0.003) (0.098) 
Leverage -0.1597* -0.0611 
 
 
 
 
(0.077)  
 
 
 Size 0.0776** 0.0297 
 
 
 
 
(0.033)  
 
 
 LAge 0.0078 0.0030 -0.0167 -0.0930** -0.0685* 
 
(0.297)  (0.175) (0.049) (0.088) 
Forecaster 
 
 -0.1733** -0.1477** -0.1061** 
  
 (0.029) (0.011) (0.041) 
Underpricing 
 
 0.0067 -0.0122 0.0024 
  
 (0.981) (0.731) (0.677) 
ROA 
 
 -0.1442*** -0.1136*** -0.1163*** 
  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.292) 
Cash flow (abs) 
 
 0.0019 0.0024 0.0023 
  
 (0.489) (0.498) (0.693) 
Lead-underwriter 
 
 -0.1533** -0.1112** -0.1331*** 
  
 (0.036) (0.048) (0.006) 
Big N 
 
 -0.0328 -0.0449 0.0032 
  
 (0.248) (0.217) (0.380) 
Inverse Mills ratio 
 
 0.2077*** -0.1557** -0.2364** 
  
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.047) 
Constant 
 
 -0.3197*** 0.5637** 0.1890* 
  
 (0.001) (0.020) (0.061) 
  
 
 
 
 
Industry & year Y  Y Y Y 
Sargan-Hansen Test   P (0.177) P (0.187) P (0.142) 
Weak instrument: Cragg-Donald (10% 
Maximal IV Size)   15.22>13.44 14.78>12.55 13.12>11.59 
No. of obs 368  368 368 368 
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Table 6: Long-term performance Buy and hold 
Table 6 provides the results of the regression analysis for the full sample focusing on long-term 
performance, as measured by buy and hold returns. Panel A shows the impact of only earnings 
management and forecasting on BHAR measured over 3 years period. Panel B shows the impact of all 
variables on BHAR measured over 1 year, 2 years and 3 years respectively. EM_discretion is the earnings 
management measured by discretionary accruals. EM_cash flow is the earnings management measured by 
abnormal cash flows from operations. EM_discretion exp is the earnings management measured by 
abnormal discretionary expenses. Forecast is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the IPO firm 
provides a forecast and zero otherwise. Forecast_error is the difference between actual profit reported 
immediately after the IPO and profit forecasts reported in the prospectuses. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is the operating income divided by the total 
assets. LAge is the logarithm of age. Retained ownership is the percentage of shares retained by the firm at 
the time of listing. Underwriter is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the underwriter is reputable and 
zero otherwise. Underpricing ŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĚĂǇ ?ƐŵĂƌŬĞƚƉƌŝĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ
offer price, divided by the offer price. Big N is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the auditing 
company is reputable and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is buy-and-hold returns BHAR measured 
over three years post-IPO using monthly returns. The values in brackets are the p-values. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A Model1   Model2   Model 3  
EM_discretionary -0.1102*** (0.000) -0.0999*** (0.000) -0.1072**** (0.000) 
EM_discretionary_exp -0.3688*** (0.000) -0.3647*** (0.000) -0.3358*** (0.000) 
Forecasting 
  
0.0313** (0.021) ²  
Forecast_error. 
    
-0.0737*** (0.000) 
Constant -0.021 (0.252) -0.0268 (0.352) -0.0368* (0.052) 
Industry & year Y 
 
Y 
 
Y  
No. of obs 367 
 
367 
 
367  
R-squared 0.124 
 
0.134 
 
0.144  
Panel B BHAR (1year)  BHAR (2year)  BHAR (3year)  
EM_discretionary -0.0431** (0.028) -0.0401** (0.021) -0.0368** (0.024) 
EM_discretionary_exp -0.4679** (0.013) -0.4439** (0.022) -0.3999** (0.011) 
Forecasting 0.0106* (0.096) 0.0112* (0.088) 0.0158* (0.081) 
Forecast_error. -0.0734*** (0.000) -0.0703*** (0.000) -0.0622*** 0.000) 
SIZE 0.0086* (0.094) 0.0082* (0.090) 0.0074* (0.081) 
ROA 0.1010** (0.035) 0.0957** (0.041) 0.0886** (0.031) 
LAge 0.0173** (0.017) 0.0162* (0.019) 0.0149*** (0.015) 
Retained ownership 0.0130 (0.133) 0.0120 (0.123) 0.0112 (0.115) 
Underwriter -0.0249* (0.096) -0.0220* (0.089) -0.0200* (0.084) 
Underpricing -0.0238** (0.026) -0.0236** (0.034) -0.0211** (0.023) 
Big N 0.0145 (0.110) 0.0137 (0.104) 0.0126* (0.0953) 
Constant -0.0724* (0.052) -0.0674** (0.049) -0.0624** (0.045) 
       
Industry & year Y  Y  Y  
No. of obs 367  367  367  
R-squared 0.148  0.151  0.157  
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Table 7: Long-term performance of the Fama and French three-factor model  
Table 7 provides the results of the regression analysis using the Fama and French three-factor model. 
Risk premium is the difference between the market return and risk-free rate. SMB is small minus large 
portfolios. HML is high minus low portfolios. The dependent variable is the portfolio returns of the IPO 
firms. Model 1 shows the results for the IPO firms that provide profit forecasts at the time of the IPO. 
Model 2 shows the results for the IPOs that did not provide profit forecasts. The values in brackets are 
the p-values. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variables Model 1   Model 2 
  Forecast=1    Forecast=0    
Risk premium 0.7826*** 
 
0.6985*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
SMB 0.3934*** 
 
0.3993*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
HML 0.0284 
 
-0.2409*** 
 
(0.787) 
 
(0.000) 
Constant 0.0070* 
 
-0.0012* 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.094) 
    No. of obs 101 
 
266 
R-squared 0.168 
 
0.201 
 
37 
 
APPENDIX 1 
Table 1A: Correlation Matrix 
 
  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
              1) EM_discretionary 1 
           2) EM_abnormal cash -0.697 1 
          3) EM_discretionary_exp -0.083 0.126 1 
         4) SIZE -0.037 -0.011 0.096 1 
        5) Leverage -0.355 0.127 0.159 0.257 1 
       6) ROA -0.544 0.534 0.080 0.007 0.067 1 
      7) Cash flow abs -0.289 0.230 0.005 0.431 0.197 0.197 1 
     8) Forecasting -0.200 0.226 0.034 0.136 0.079 0.200 0.016 1 
    9) Age -0.167 0.190 -0.066 0.000 0.032 0.198 -0.012 0.123 1 
   10) Retained ownership -0.122 0.157 0.057 0.176 0.178 0.175 0.101 0.210 0.119 1 
  11) Underpricing -0.052 -0.008 0.066 0.135 0.006 -0.014 0.103 0.003 -0.051 -0.105 1 
 
12) Lead-underwriter 0.235 -0.200 -0.179 0.024 -0.024 -0.224 0.024 -0.302 -0.094 -0.074 0.158 1 
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Appendix 2: The figure below shows the median earnings management for different measures over -3 
and +3 around the IPOs. The figures show the earnings management for IPOs that provide profit 
forecasts and those that do not. 
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Appendix 3 
Measuring discretionary accruals earnings management. 
 To estimate discretionary accruals earning management (EM), we use the Dechow et al. 
(1995) cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones model. Following Armstrong et al. 
(2009), we scaled all variables by average total assets, rather than lagged total assets. This is 
due to the fact that for the IPO firms, lagged total assets are relatively smaller than total assets 
at the end of the IPO year and hence might inflate the measurement of accruals in the year of 
the IPO (see Ball and Shivakumar 2008). The coefficients used to estimate discretionary accruals 
for the IPO firms are estimated using year and industry cross-sectional regression for all non-
IPO firms listed on the LSE in the years prior to and succeeding the  IPO year. We included 
return on assets (ROA) in our model specification to control for extreme operating 
performance, as pointed out by Kothari et al. (2005). Normal accruals are estimated using the 
following: 
itit
it
it
it
it
itit
it ROA
AveTAsset
PPE
AveTAsset
Sales
AveTAssetAveTAsset
TA [JJJJD ' 43210 1   (1) 
where TAit is the total accruals and is defined as earnings before extraordinary items minus cash 
flows from operations. AveTAssetsit is the average total assets. 'Salesit is the change in sales 
during a year scaled by average total assets. PPEit is the gross value of property, plant and 
equipment scaled by average total assets. ROAit is the return on assets computed as operating 
income scaled by average total assets.  
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Normal accruals for the IPO firms in each year and industry are estimated using the following 
model, where the coefficients of the model are estimated from equation (1).  
it
it
it
it
itit
it
it ROAAveTAsset
PPE
AveTAsset
RECSales
AveTAsset
NA 43210 ÖÖÖ1ÖÖ JJJJD ''    (2) 
'RECit is the change in receivables during the year scaled by average total assets. Discretionary 
accruals are defined as the difference between total accruals and normal accruals, as in the 
above equation. 
Measuring abnormal cash flow. 
 Abnormal cash flow earnings management is estimated using the earnings management 
model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and applied by Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. 
(2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012). We focus on two real earnings 
management activities: sales manipulation and reducing discretionary expenses. Sales 
manipulation leads to lower levels of cash flows from operations, and can be managed by 
offering more price discounts and/or more liberal credit terms (see Roychowdhury 2006). 
Discretionary expenses represent the sum of research and development expenses (R&D), 
advertising expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A). Reducing 
discretionary expenses in the current period will boost reported earnings in the current period. 
To maintain consistency, we scaled all variables by average total assets. 
We estimated the normal level of cash flows from operations for the non-IPO sample using a 
cross-sectional industry year regression:  
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itit
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itit
it ROA
AveTAsset
PPE
AveTAsset
Sales
AveTAssetAveTAsset
CFO [JJJJD ' 43210 1  (3) 
where Citi is cash flow from operations for firm if in period t. The abnormal CFO for the IPO 
firms is calculated as the difference between actual CFO and the normal level of CFO. The 
normal level of CFO is computed using the coefficients from the above equation. 
 
Measuring Discretionary expenses 
 
 Following Roychowdhury (2006), we estimate the normal level of discretionary 
expenses using the following model: 
it
it
ti
itit
it
AveTAsset
Sales
AveTAssetAveTAsset
DisExp [JJD  1,210 1       (4) 
where Deepti is calculated as the sum of SG&A, R&D and advertising expenses for firm i in 
period t. We use lagged sales to control for the fact that firms might manage sales upward to 
increase reported earnings during the year (Roychowdhury 2006). The abnormal discretionary 
expenses for the IPO firms are calculated as the difference between the actual and normal level 
of discretionary expenses. 
 
 
 
 
